United States History I & II
United States History I & II

United States History I & II

Lead Author(s): Sara Eskridge

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Top Hat

Sara Eskridge, U.S. History I or II, Only One Edition Needed

Norton

Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty, 5th Edition

MacMillan

Roark, Johnson, Furstenberg, Stage, and Igo, The American Promise, 2 Volumes, 8th Edition

Pearson

Keene, Cornell, and O’Donnell, Visions of America, 2013

Pricing

Average price of textbook across most common format

Up to 40-60% more affordable

Lifetime access on any device

$63.90

Hardcover print text only

$87.99

Per volume

$79.60

Digital only

Always up-to-date content, constantly revised by community of professors

Constantly revised and updated by a community of professors with the latest content

In-Book Interactivity

Includes embedded multi-media files and integrated software to enhance visual presentation of concepts directly in textbook

Only available with supplementary resources at additional cost

Only available with supplementary resources at additional cost

Only available with supplementary resources at additional cost

Customizable

Ability to revise, adjust and adapt content to meet needs of course and instructor

All-in-one Platform

Access to additional questions, test banks, and slides available within one platform

Pricing

Average price of textbook across most common format

Top Hat

Sara Eskridge, U.S. History I or II, Only One Edition Needed

Up to 40-60% more affordable

Lifetime access on any device

Norton

Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty, 5th Edition

$63.90

Hardcover print text only

MacMillan

Roark, Johnson, Furstenberg, Stage, and Igo, The American Promise, 2 Volumes, 8th Edition

$87.99

Per volume

Pearson

Keene, Cornell, and O’Donnell, Visions of America, 2013

$79.60

Digital only

Always up-to-date content, constantly revised by community of professors

Content meets standard for Introduction to Anatomy & Physiology course, and is updated with the latest content

Top Hat

Sara Eskridge, U.S. History I or II, Only One Edition Needed

Norton

Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty, 5th Edition

MacMillan

Case, Fair, Oster, The American Promise, 2 Volumes

McGraw-Hill

McConnell et al., Visions of America, 2nd Edition

In-book Interactivity

Includes embedded multi-media files and integrated software to enhance visual presentation of concepts directly in textbook

Top Hat

Sara Eskridge, U.S. History I or II, Only One Edition Needed

Norton

Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty, 5th Edition

MacMillan

Case, Fair, Oster, The American Promise, 2 Volumes

McGraw-Hill

McConnell et al., Visions of America, 2nd Edition

Customizable

Ability to revise, adjust and adapt content to meet needs of course and instructor

Top Hat

Sara Eskridge, U.S. History I or II, Only One Edition Needed

Norton

Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty, 5th Edition

MacMillan

Case, Fair, Oster, The American Promise, 2 Volumes

McGraw-Hill

McConnell et al., Visions of America, 2nd Edition

All-in-one Platform

Access to additional questions, test banks, and slides available within one platform

Top Hat

Sara Eskridge, U.S. History I or II, Only One Edition Needed

Norton

Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty, 5th Edition

MacMillan

Case, Fair, Oster, The American Promise, 2 Volumes

McGraw-Hill

McConnell et al., Visions of America, 2nd Edition

About this textbook

Lead Authors

Sara Eskridge, Ph.DRandolph-Macon College, VA

Dr. Eskridge is a Professor of History at Western Governors University. She specializes in Civil Rights, Cold War, Southern, and Cultural History. She is the author of Rube Tube: CBS as Rural Comedy in the Sixties (University of Missouri Press, 2019) as well as several articles and book chapters on southern mediated images during the Civil Rights Movement and the Cold War.

Contributing Authors

Andrew WegmannLoyola University

Michael CarverCalifornia Polytechnic State University

Michael FrawleyUniversity of Texas of the Permian Basin

Linda ClemmonsIllinois State University

Angela HessCameron University

Sam NelsonRidgewater College

Volker JanssenCalifornia State University

Lance JandaCameron University

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Chapter 25: The Cold War


Chapter Overview

In the aftermath of World War II, the United States had seemingly reached the zenith of its status and power in the world. On the home front, Americans enjoyed an unprecedented economic boom which accompanied a massive uptick in consumer confidence and a burgeoning Baby Boom. However, the United States did experience some pitfalls in the post-war world. The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was unraveling quickly as the Allies attempted to rebuild Europe in the late 1940s. Each side harbored suspicions about the other, and the United States constantly worried that the Soviets were not keeping the promises they had made during the war. The United States adopted a strategy of containment, designed to keep Soviet influence from spreading into other nations. 

Throughout the 1940s, the two sides repeatedly engaged in confrontations on the world stage, occasionally prompting concerns that World War III was imminent. Although the two nations primarily limited their conflict to a war of words, a so-called “Cold War,” the two sides did meet on the battlefield indirectly during the Korean War. Concerns about the Soviets also expanded beyond the geopolitical stage. In the United States, a series of high-profile spy cases created hysteria among politicians and citizens alike. Fearing the communist infiltration of the United States, a full-fledged Red Scare developed in the early 1950s, creating long-lasting changes in the American political and cultural landscape. As the Red Scare faded and the U.S. and the Soviet Union settled into a predictable pattern of threats, nuclear armament, and covert operations, the Cold War became a permanent feature of American life. It was only when the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear war in 1962 that both superpowers finally realized the dangers inherent in their confrontation.

Chapter Objectives

  • Describe the defining characteristics of social and family life in the post-war era
  • Explain the reasons why the U.S. economy grew rapidly in the aftermath of World War II
  • Explain the events which led to the development of the Cold War
  • Describe the events that led to the Korean War, explain U.S. involvement in the event, and indicate how the event represented U.S. fears about the so-called “domino theory”
  • Explain the reasons for the Red Scare and indicate how McCarthyism played a role in that development



The U.S. after the War: Baby Boom, Housing, Consumerist Culture, and Postwar Liberalism

In many ways, domestic life in the United States after World War II was a study in idyll and prosperity. Throughout the war, Americans on the home front had experienced rationing, shortages, and a lack of consumer goods, but the economy came roaring to life as factories shifted from wartime production back to consumer goods. Part of the reason for this prosperity was that most consumer production in Europe and Asia had been decimated by the war, forcing both continents to purchase consumer goods from the United States. Additionally, two major domestic factors contributed to the U.S. economic boom. As millions of GIs returned home from war and women left the workplace to re-enter the home, they immediately began building families, causing a massive spike in the U.S. population starting in September 1946. There was a 20 percent increase in the number of children born between 1945 and 1946 alone, and the numbers continued to rise. This birth trend continued until 1964, thus reversing two decades of lowered childbearing as a result of the war and the Great Depression (Figure 25.1). This so-called “baby boom” helped to fuel the consumer revolution that overtook the United States in the post-war period.

25.01 - Level 1

The "Baby Boom" generation refers to those born

A

During World War I

B

During the Great Depression

C

1941-1945

D

1946-1964

E

1950s

F

1960s


Figure 25.1: This chart shows the rate of U.S. live births from 1909-2009. The portion in red indicates the Baby Boom between 1946-1964.​​


25.02 - Level 3

The chart above indicates that there was a large dip in the number of children born between the mid-1920s and late 1930s. What do you think accounts for this drop?

A

Fewer marriages

B

Access to more effective birth control

C

Societal pressures to not have as many children

D

The Great Depression


Another major factor in the post-war economic boom was the introduction of the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944, commonly known as the GI Bill. Anxious to avoid another Bonus Army situation, Congress funded a massive program designed to give veterans advantages in the post-war society. The benefits included preferred access to government jobs, housing loans, access to government health-care, and most importantly, federally subsidized access to higher education. Although the G.I. Bill was, in theory, equally applicable to all veterans, white applicants received preferential treatment over African American applicants and those African Americans who were able to access benefits often found it difficult to either obtain a mortgage or acceptance to an accredited university. This was particularly true in the South, which was home to nearly 80 percent of African Americans and still fully in the clutches of Jim Crow. Most of the southern state flagship universities did not accept African American students and the historically black colleges and universities did not have to resources to accommodate the extra students, meaning that many had to forego their education for lack of options. Although there was a clear racial divide in terms of who benefitted from the GI Bill, for the first time in U.S. history, large numbers of working and middle class men attended college and universities and earned degrees. This translated to larger earnings in the workforce, which in turn meant more disposable income.

Housing constituted the largest expenditure in the post-war economy. As families expanded, the formerly common custom of living with one’s parents in the Victorian fashion became outmoded, and young families sought to find places of their own. However, because so many families were shopping at the same time, the nation experienced a massive housing shortage in the years immediately following the war. One housing developer, William Levitt, saw a solution to the problem. In 1947, he purchased a potato field in Long Island, New York and built nearly 11,000 houses, each with two bedrooms and approximately 900 square feet. Preference was given to veterans and their families, primarily due to the government-sponsored mortgages received through the GI Bill, although people of color were explicitly excluded from purchasing or renting homes there, regardless of their GI Bill funding. He envisioned pre-fabricated neighborhoods that were safe and affordable for the post-war family. This new neighborhood, dubbed Levittown, immediately sold out, prompting Levitt to build more in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and even Puerto Rico. Builders in other regions soon followed suit. Although previous developers had pioneered suburban developments decades before, Levitt’s techniques made more rapid, standardized community development possible.


25.03 - Level 2

Click on the state where the first “Levittown” was built.


Question 25.04

25.04 - Level 5

Based on your knowledge of race relations in the United States, why do you think that so many limitations were placed on the benefits that African American veterans could receive from the G.I. bill? Be sure to point to specific policies and how they were implemented.

Click here to see the answer to Question 25.04.

With the development of the suburbs came entire industries designed to cater to the newly established suburbanites and their growing families. New products such as dishwashers, dryers, and vacuum cleaners became must-have items for busy mothers with young kids at home. Time and labor-saving TV dinners also became popular for the same reason—instead of slaving for hours over a home-cooked meal, mothers could pop frozen dinners into the oven and go about their lives. Television displaced the radio as the preferred method of home entertainment as families gathered around to watch The Milton Berle Show and I Love Lucy.

With unprecedented prosperity in American homes came a newfound commitment to sharing the wealth. The United States was an undisputed economic leader in the world and its many people were comfortable and prosperous; there seemed no reason why the nation could not be more generous with those Americans who still struggled. President Harry Truman hinted at his commitment to this philosophy in January 1949, when he introduced a comprehensive bill designed as an extension of Roosevelt’s New Deal. Dubbed the Fair Deal, the proposal included requests for universal health insurance coverage, a higher minimum wage, expansion of unemployment insurance, and a public works program, among other things. Although Congress did raise the minimum wage, the rest of the proposals did not pass due to ongoing disputes over the conversion back to a peacetime economy. Nonetheless, the Fair Deal demonstrated Truman’s interest in continuing New Deal principles even in times of economic prosperity.

At the same time, Americans were concerned about the apparent menace presented by expansive Soviet communism and were willing to expend their resources to stave off this threat. The combination of a generous domestic policy combined with a hawkish foreign policy created an ideological hybrid called post-war liberalism. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson all represented facets of postwar liberalism.

25.05 - Level 3

In what way does postwar liberalism resemble the modern concept of liberalism?

A

It supports an aggressive foreign policy

B

It calls for austere domestic policies

C

It advocates for generous domestic policies

D

It calls for both an aggressive foreign policy and generous domestic policies


Question 25.06

25.06 - Level 2

Describe some of the broad sociohistorical conditions that contributed to the boom that the American economy experienced in the postwar era.

Click here to see the answer to Question 25.06.


25.07 - Level 3

With which of the following common life challenges would a World War II veteran have not received help from the federal government and the G.I. Bill?

A

Paying for college

B

Getting a mortgage

C

Buying a car

D

Applying for a job in the Federal Parks Service


Occupied Europe

Post-war liberalism became popular because there was seemingly much to fear from the outside world in the aftermath of World War II. As hostilities in the European theatre of war drew to a close, the Allies struggled to maintain cordial relations with one another in the face of mounting obstacles and warring ideologies; however, this is not to say that the disparate countries could not find common ground. On April 22, 1945, delegates from fifty nations met in San Francisco to draw up the Charter for the United Nations. The charter called for the creation of two organizations: the General Assembly, which included delegates from all member nations, and the Security Council, which contained 11 members elected by the General Assembly. The Security Council was the organization primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and stability. The United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain were all members of the Security Council.

Question 25.08

25.08 - Level 4

Why do you think world leaders—U.S. leaders included—viewed the United Nations as an important organization in the wake of World War II? How was the situation different from when world leaders had formed the League of Nations after World War I?

Click here to see the answer to Question 25.08.

The Allies also agreed that war criminals in both Germany and Japan needed to face trial for their crimes. In 1945, the four major Allied powers formed the International Military Tribunal (IMT) for the purposes of punishing German war criminals. Between 1945 and 1949, the IMT orchestrated a series of trials carried out in Nuremberg, Germany, former site of Nazi Party rallies. The trials were carried out by American and British laws, with prosecutors and defense attorneys, but the sentences were handed down by a tribunal of judges rather than a jury. The most infamous of the trials was the first, held in the fall of 1945, for 24 of the top Nazi leaders. During the trial, prosecutors entered into evidence reel after reel of footage from liberated death camps all over Europe. The tribunal found all but three of the defendants guilty, and 12 received death sentences.

Spotlight on Primary Source

The below video depicts the sentencing at the Nuremberg trials. Video courtesy of the National Archives and Universal Newsreels. Warning: some graphic imagery contained in the video.

Question 25.09

25.09 - Level 2

What tone does the newsreel take in discussing the crimes of the accused at Nuremberg? What specific crimes are the men accused of committing? Based on what you saw here, how would you describe the demeanor of those on trial?

Click here to see the answer to Question 25.09.



Beyond establishing conditions for lasting world peace and seeking retribution for war crimes, the Allies had difficulty finding common ground. There are multiple ways to read the relationship between the Soviets and Americans during this period. The traditional American narrative paints Joseph Stalin as a paranoid dictator intent on expanding communist influence all over the globe, and the Americans as courageous capitalists attempting to thwart his influence. From the Soviet point of view, the Americans were the power-hungry imperialists set on spreading their influence by taking away hard-won Soviet-controlled territory. What is clear is that by the time the war ended in May 1945, the Soviets had installed sympathetic governments in Poland and Romania, thus violating promises made at the Yalta Conference to hold democratic elections in occupied Eastern European countries. Despite this breach, the Americans and British continued to honor their part of the agreements made at Yalta, in hopes that the gesture of good faith would create better relations with the Soviets.

The Allies decided to create separate spheres of influence when occupying Germany in the summer of 1945. In addition to creating sectors for Britain, the U.S., and the Soviet Union, the Allies also decided to give France a portion as well. Each sector was responsible for “denazification,” stabilizing the economy and the currency, and establishing a functioning occupational government. In theory, traffic and the flow of information traveled freely between sectors, but the French, British, and U.S. sectors found it increasingly difficult to obtain cooperation from the Soviet sector. Diplomats and government officials were held and searched at checkpoints, and occasionally not allowed to cross into Soviet territory. The Soviets also disagreed with the other Allies concerning the future of post-war Germany. 

While the other Allies had learned the lesson of the Treaty of Versailles and sought to rebuild Germany into a democratic ally, the Soviet Union sought to punish its former enemy so that it could never again become a threat. Having been betrayed and invaded by the Wehrmacht only four years prior, the Soviets believed that the Germans were inherently militaristic and untrustworthy, and that they must be kept low in order to make Europe safe. As a result, the Soviet interim government actively worked to disable the industrial capabilities of its occupational sector, transporting machinery and workers to the Soviet Union. As a result, the eastern portion of Germany failed to thrive in the wake of the war.

Question 25.10

25.10 - Level 3

Describe the Soviet Union’s beliefs and concerns about the United States and Germany after World War II. What motivated their actions?

Click here to see the answer to Question 25.10.

Occupied Japan



The occupation of Japan went more smoothly than that of Germany, mostly because the United States did not have to share leadership and responsibility with another nation. In the treaty negotiations with Japan, the Soviets received occupational rights to northern Korea, a token of appreciation for their minimal efforts in the Pacific War. Otherwise, the United States maintained full control of the occupation, although Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China all participated in an occupational advisory council. While the Japanese had expressed concerns about the intentions of the Americans, these proved short-lived. Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), assumed authority over the occupation and made it a point to govern the nation humanely. One of his first major acts as SCAP was to create a tribunal for punishing Japanese war crimes stemming back to the 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Although the U.S. created the tribunal unilaterally, all of the nations that signed Japan’s instrument of surrender were offered judgeships and prosecution teams. The tribunal tried 27 top Japanese political and military officials between 1946 and 1948, and found all of the defendants guilty (Figure 25.2).

Figure 25.2: Former Japanese Minister of War Hideki Tojo takes the stand at his trial for war crimes in Tokyo, Japan. [1]


As the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union became increasingly problematic, the U.S. looked to build Japan’s economic and political power so as to make them a reliable ally against the communist threat. In service of this goal, the U.S. championed significant military, political and social reforms in postwar Japan. Two of the most important changes were in the political realm. The U.S. insisted on a new constitution which downgraded the emperor’s authority while increasing parliamentary power, and also gave women the right to vote. The occupying government also embarked on an intensive campaign of land redistribution, designed to benefit the large number of tenant farmers at the expense of the large landowners, whom the United States considered economically and politically crucial in creating Japan’s expansionist policies of the 1930s and 1940s. 

Although the occupational government initially dismantled the Japanese military, after a few years, the U.S. championed its rebuilding. The Japanese demurred at this. So long as the Japanese remained unarmed, the U.S. was responsible for its protection. This became a point of contention between the two countries, as the U.S. wanted to rebuild Japanese military power so that it could become an effective ally against the Soviet Union. Despite this point of contention, the U.S. occupation of Japan concluded in 1952 after a relatively uneventful tenure.

25.11 - Level 6

How were the reforms instituted in Japan during the U.S. occupation beneficial to the United States?

A

They created more opportunities for trade between the United States and Japan.

B

They lessened the military threat that Japan posed to the United States.

C

Japan became a more reliable political ally because its government was now based on democratic principles.

D

They made Japan a more powerful military ally for the United States.


25.12 Level 5

The U.S. occupation of Japan was relatively short — less than seven years. How do you account for its brevity?


The Allies and Eastern Europe

While the occupational process in Japan ran relatively smoothly, the same process in Europe became increasingly fraught. In 1947, the Council of Foreign Ministers produced treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Romania, all of which affirmed the authority of the Soviet Union in their territory. There were a number of anti-communist political aspirants in those nations, but they could not make progress in the presence of the oppressively large Soviet military. More often than not, such leaders lost their lives for their opposition to communist policies and puppet governments. For their part, the Soviets did not see their behavior as a breach of wartime promises, viewing their occupation of Eastern Europe as the equivalent of U.S. occupation in Japan.

In March 1946, less than one year after the end of the war, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill visited the United States, stopping in President Truman’s hometown of Independence, Missouri to give a speech on foreign policy at a nearby college. In his address, Churchill extolled the benefits of the special friendship between the U.S. and Great Britain while denouncing the Soviets’ expansionist tendencies. He declared that “from Stettin in the Baltic, to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the entire continent.” Drawing parallels to Britain’s appeasement of Hitler in 1938, Churchill concluded his remarks by pointing out that the Soviets respected nothing more than a display of power, a clear suggestion that the U.S. and its allies needed to exert overt power in an effort to dislodge Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. Harry Truman, who sat on the platform riveted during Churchill’s speech, was nonetheless nonplussed. Truman held out hope that the relationship with the Soviets would improve and while he supported Churchill, he felt that the former prime minister’s opinions would be mistaken as representative of his own, therefore causing a rift in an already unstable relationship. Although Truman spent several more months trying to come to terms with the Soviets, many historians consider Churchill’s speech to be an opening salvo of the Cold War.


25.13 - Level 4
No correct answers: No correct answer has been set for this question

Why did Churchill choose to make his forceful "Iron Curtain" speech in Independence, Missouri, with Harry Truman present?


Establishing the Policy of Containment

One year later, the relationship between the two superpowers had not improved, leaving the United States to plot its next step. In February 1946, George Kennan, a young State Department official stationed in Moscow, issued a lengthy statement describing what that next step should entail. This document, which became public when published as an anonymous article in the journal Foreign Affairs, is often referred to as the Long Telegram. As a Moscow insider, Kennan had a good working knowledge of the politics inside the Kremlin, and insisted that the Soviets were determined to expand their sphere of influence not only through Eastern Europe, but around the world. Kennan urged the U.S. government to embark on a comprehensive campaign of containment in order to keep Soviet aggression at bay. Kennan’s article quickly proved controversial, as some thought that Kennan had overstated the problem and his solution overcommitted the United States to foreign policy concerns, while others claimed that Kennan’s solution wasn’t aggressive enough and he should have called for the U.S. to devote all its energies to rolling back Soviet power. Nevertheless, Kennan’s assessment became the foundation of the containment policy that underpinned U.S. foreign policy for the remainder of the Cold War.

The Truman administration agreed with Kennan’s paper, but did not know how to proceed. Events in Eastern Europe soon forced a decision. In late 1946 and early 1947, Great Britain sent a notice to the United States informing the government of calls for help it had received from Greece and Turkey. Both nations had recently come under pressure from communist groups, presumably backed by the Soviet government. Both nations were strategically located, directly across the Aegean Sea from each other. Not coincidentally, this was the Soviets’ primary aquatic pathway to the Mediterranean Sea. Great Britain had traditionally provided assistance to this region, but in their notification to the United States, they indicated that the financially beleaguered nation would not be able to continue with aid efforts after March 1947. The United States faced a decision: it either needed to resign itself to Soviet aggression expanding outside of Eastern Europe or prepare a plan of action.


25.14 - Level 1

Identify one of the nations whose struggles with communist infiltrators led to the creation of the Truman Doctrine.


25.15 - Level 1

Who is widely credited with coining the term “Iron Curtain”?

A

Franklin D. Roosevelt

B

Winston Churchill

C

Harry S. Truman

D

Josef Stalin


In a speech to Congress on March 12, 1947, President Truman explained the problem facing Greece and Turkey. He indicated that instability in the region would lead to instability in the Middle East, which was becoming increasingly important to U.S. national security. He asked for 400 million dollars in assistance for both governments, as well as support for sending civilian and military personnel to the region, declaring that it should be the policy of the United States to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Congress approved the request. Truman’s speech, now known as the Truman Doctrine, established a precedent for containment that became a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy for more than four decades. The outcome of U.S. assistance to Greece and Turkey, however, has a mixed legacy. While U.S. assistance did help the two nations thwart communist takeovers, it also allowed military dictatorships to assume control of both governments. While both governments were anti-communist, they also created unstable political and economic environments characterized by violence and oppression. The containment policy was off to an inauspicious start.


25.16 - Level 2

Which of the following concepts best encapsulates Harry Truman’s Cold War ideology?

A

Isolationism

B

Containment

C

Covert Operations

D

Diplomacy


The Marshall Plan

Truman’s Doctrine of containment only represented the beginning of the U.S.’s shifting policies toward communist threats. In the spring of 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall traveled through Europe on diplomatic business and expressed horror at the conditions he saw there. People in rags, structural damage from the war as yet unrepaired, inflation—it seemed that the entire continent was mired in poverty and despair. Marshall reflected that such conditions in Germany after World War I had produced Hitler, and believed that Europe in its present state was susceptible to communist overtures.

Marshall developed a plan, which he introduced during a commencement speech at Harvard University in June 1947. In the speech, Marshall outlined a proposal to rebuild Europe’s economy. Congress, concerned with the perceived expanding communist threat, took Marshall’s message seriously and passed the Economic Cooperation Act the following March. The plan called for the U.S. to give the war-torn nations of Western Europe 12 billion dollars for economic development and rebuilding (Figure 25.3). Although Congress formally offered Eastern European nations money as well, the Soviet Union blocked those nations from receiving assistance.

The nations that received benefits through the Marshall Plan experienced an almost immediate economic revival. Although the economic disparities between Eastern and Western Europe were undeniable, thus sparking Soviet paranoia about U.S. domination of Europe, most saw the Marshall Plan as an unmitigated good. George Marshall became the first and only military general to receive a Nobel Peace Prize, and the plan established a precedent for the utilization of foreign aid as a form of containment.

25.17 - Level 3

Which of the following nations did not accept any aid from the Marshall Plan?

A

Italy

B

Germany

C

Greece

D

Hungary


25.18 Level 3

Based on the chart located below, how do you account for the fact that some European nations received far more Marshall Plan funds than others?


Figure 25.3: The above chart shows the cumulative amount of money distributed under the Marshall Plan, broken down by country.​​


Berlin Airlift

While the Marshall Plan helped to rebuild Europe’s economy, shifts in the German occupation plan created massive shifts in the political atmosphere on the continent. In 1947, the British and American occupation zones combined, with the French zone joining in a year later. The three zones created a combined occupation government and introduced a new currency. The combined zone, sometimes referred to as the Trizone or Trizonia, created new tensions among the former war allies. Already mistrustful of the western powers and their intentions, the Soviets now believed the western powers were setting up an economic and political takeover of Germany, with a possible eye toward liberating Eastern Europe.

In 1948, the Soviets attempted to avenge the creation of the Trizone by withdrawing from the Allied Control Council, an organization that had met regularly since the end of the war to coordinate occupation efforts among the Allies. They also formulated a plan to take over all of Berlin. Germany’s capital city remained under occupation by all four major Allied powers, but the Soviets argued that because the Trizone comprised the majority of German territory, they should be compensated with all of Berlin because it was located within Soviet-controlled territory. The Soviets initially encouraged this move by making travel between the zones more difficult and blocking shipments of goods between East and West Berlin. When this method failed, the Soviets escalated the conflict. On June 24, 1948, the Soviets blockaded all road, rail, and water access to West Berlin. Premier Stalin believed that if the Western allies no longer had access to West Berlin, they would abandon the occupation zone, leaving it to the Soviets. Meanwhile, the Soviets would not provide supplies to West Berlin until they acceded to its influence. West Berlin only had a couple weeks of food and fuel to burn before it would require outside assistance.

Instead of abandoning West Berlin, the western Allies took action. President Truman recognized that if the western Allies abandoned West Berlin, the Soviets would interpret that as weakness and take even more liberties in Europe. He organized a coalition of nations willing to provide planes, food, fuel, and manpower to supply West Berlin from the air. Although the Soviets had cut off most routes into West Berlin, the air routes still remained open and there were three airports in the city through which the Allies could make deliveries. Truman realized that if the Soviets interfered with the Berlin Airlift, codenamed Operation Vittles, they risked worldwide condemnation for interfering with a humanitarian aid mission.

Between June 26, 1948 and May 1949, Operation Vittles worked continuously to support the stranded citizens of West Berlin. Over 270,000 flights flew into West Berlin airports during those months, carrying food, fuel, and other goods to support the beleaguered city. At the height of the airlift, a plane landed every 45 seconds at the Templehof airport (Figure 25.4). All told, the Allies dropped 2.3 million tons of cargo into West Berlin. The Allies not only provided necessities, they also brought in magazines, candy, and other sought-after consumer goods when possible. The steady trickle of supplies allowed the people of West Berlin to survive in relative comfort, although there was severe rationing on fuel and electricity, and a massive shortage in consumer goods. In contrast, East Berlin suffered during the blockade, as the western Allies withheld supplies from the eastern sector in an attempt to force the Soviets to lift the Berlin blockade.

By the spring of 1949, it was clear that the Soviet blockade had failed. The Soviets had hoped that the blockade would force the removal of the Allies from West Berlin, but instead, the city was more closely connected to Western Europe than ever. The Soviets now appeared as evil and unfeeling overlords, attempting to starve West Berlin into capitulation, while the other western Allies were united in their attempt to defeat the blockade and were forced to find areas of common interest. Moreover, in the spring, the western Allies officially handed the reins of government back to the citizens, who created the Federal Republic of Germany (often referred to as West Germany) in May 1949. Realizing their strategic error, the Soviets quietly lifted the blockade on May 12. Despite the roads, water routes, and rail lines re-opening, the Allies continued to airlift supplies into West Berlin for several months, building a stockpile in the event of another blockade in the future.

25.19 Level 6

The Berlin Airlift is usually help up as a model example of international humanitarian aid. Can you think of any ways in which orchestrating the airlift would have helped the nations who participated?


25.20 - Level 1

Which of the following nations did not control one of the four “zones” of occupied postwar Germany?

A

United States

B

Russia

C

France

D

Belgium


Figure 25.4: Airplanes lining up for takeoff from Berlin’s Templehof Airport during Berlin Airlift, August 1948. [2]

Despite Soviet attempts to minimize the memory of the Berlin blockade, the event had a number of ramifications that echoed for years. Not only did the blockade amp up Cold War tensions and exacerbate problems that already existed between the former Allies, but it also created a sense of urgency for the other Allies in creating an organization designed for their common defense. In 1949, as the Berlin blockade was coming to an end, the United States, Canada, and ten European nations created the North American Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO was a peacetime military alliance, meant to establish mutual defense for all members against aggressions perpetrated by the Soviet Union. NATO members wanted to deter Soviet aggression, but they also hoped the creation of an alliance would create a sense of European unity and help dispel the more militaristic aspects of European culture still remaining after World War II. More nations gradually joined the organization, but NATO did not engage in any direct military action for nearly 50 years. Nonetheless, the Soviets felt threatened by the gesture, and in 1955, they established the Warsaw Pact, a league of Eastern European nations designed to counter NATO. Divisions between the former allies were becoming more pronounced with each passing year (Figure 25.5).


Figure 25.5: The above map highlights NATO members (in blue) vs. members of the Warsaw Pact (in red).​​


25.21 - Level 2

Identify the following nations as either members of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, or neither.

Premise
Response
1

France

A

Neither

2

Russia

B

Warsaw

3

Turkey

C

Neither

4

Hungary

D

NATO

5

Yugoslavia

E

Warsaw

6

Sweden

F

NATO


“Losing” China

In the fall of 1949, an event occurred which refocused American concerns away from the Soviet Union and into Asia. On October 1, after a decades-long civil war between Mao Zedong’s communists and Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalist government, Mao declared that the Nationalist Chinese government had gone into exile and that the communists were establishing a new government, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The “loss” of China was a major blow for the Truman administration, which feared being perceived as soft on communism. The United States immediately suspended diplomatic relations with the newly formed PRC, not to resume them until the 1970s.

For the United States, the loss of China meant that new approaches were needed to protect against further communist encroachment. In early 1950, the National Security Council (NSC) issued a top-secret report addressing the need for amped up security measures, both domestically and abroad. The report, titled NSC-68, addressed the Soviets’ recent acquisition of nuclear weapons (they exploded their first atomic weapon in the summer of 1949) and what this meant for the future of Soviet aggression. NSC-68 considered four possible options: a return to complete isolationism, continued diplomatic negotiations with the Soviets, war with the Soviets, or an increased U.S. military, political, and economic presence throughout the world.

Question 25.22

25.22 - Level 6

Given the four options outlined in NSC-68, which would you choose? What were the risks of each option?

Click here to see the answer to Question 25.22.

The document clearly favored the last option. The U.S. armed forces had cut down substantially in the wake of World War II, resulting in an 80% drop in enlisted men by 1949. The NSC suggested that if the United States had maintained a larger military presence, particularly in Asia, the communists would not have been able to take China so easily. The report also suggested that a larger military presence would discourage the Soviets from attempting any aggressive takeover maneuvers in other Eastern European or Middle Eastern nations. They advocated the creation of a permanent wartime standing military, trained and capable of fighting a full-scale war at a moment’s notice.

The second suggestion in NSC-68 called for building up the U.S. arsenal with the creation of a thermonuclear weapon: namely, a hydrogen bomb. Now that the Soviets possessed an atomic weapon, the United States had lost its advantage in the arms race and needed to regain it. The hydrogen bomb, purportedly a thousand times more powerful than its plutonium predecessor, was the largest sticking point with members of the Truman administration. Critics like George Kennan pointed out that the U.S. already had a significant advantage over the Soviet Union in terms of arsenal size, advocating for continued economic and political measures to create favorable conditions for the United States. Meanwhile, J. Robert Oppenheimer, one of the creators of the original atomic bomb, argued against the creation of a hydrogen bomb due to its destructive capabilities, both on the civilian population and the natural environment.

25.23 - Level 1

Match the person or document in Column A with the corresponding stance on the hydrogen bomb, located in Column B.

Premise
Response
1

NSC-68

A

H-bomb unnecessary because U.S. already has nuclear advantage

2

Robert Oppenheimer

B

Supported thermonuclear weapons

3

George Kennan

C

Hydrogen bombs are detrimental to the environment

The Korean War

The invasion of South Korea by Soviet-backed North Korean forces in June 1950 quickly changed the minds of those uncertain about NSC-68. The National Security Council’s recommendations quickly became policy, including the immediate production of a hydrogen bomb, which the United States successfully tested in 1952. The invasion of South Korea came as a shock. The Soviets had briefly occupied North Korea in the years directly after World War II they had removed occupation forces from the country in 1949. Though the United States had concerns about the lingering communist impact, it did not believe North Korea capable of a sustained invasion against the democratic South Korea. Unbeknownst to the U.S., Joseph Stalin had met with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in early 1950 and assessed the risk of invading South Korea. After determining that the U.S. military presence in Asia was weak, that they had not intervened during the communist takeover of China, and that Korea was a much lower strategic priority, Stalin concluded that Kim could probably reunite the Korean peninsula under his communist government with no interference from the United States.

In this assessment, Stalin miscalculated. The United States, horrified at the prospect of losing yet another Asian nation to communism so soon after the loss of China, refused to allow the possibility of North Korean victory in the south. In the minds of the Truman administration, the invasion not only proved the essential correctness of the containment theory, but it also demonstrated that communism was on the march across Asia at that very moment. Buoyed by a sense of moral urgency, the United States led a coalition of United Nations forces determined to stop the North Korean advance. Troops from fifteen nations immediately headed for South Korea to back up the beleaguered troops there, although the United States provided approximately 85% of their number.

This initial allotment of troops was not nearly enough to fend off the North Koreans, who were trained and supplied by the Soviet Union. Within a couple of months, northern troops, though vastly outnumbered, had pinned the South Koreans and their allies into a small area in the southeast corner of the peninsula near the port city of Pusan. Called the Pusan Perimeter, this last bastion of South Korean defenses struggled to maintain itself while waiting for a larger allied invasion.

25.24 - Level 2

Click on the area of today's map where the South Korean and U.S. forces were pinned down at the beginning of the Korean War.


Allied forces could not agree on an appropriate location for this second invasion. Many of the major port cities in Korea were located directly on the water, above steep, rocky shorelines that had no beaches and incredibly variable tides, which made troop landings difficult, if not impossible. General Douglas MacArthur, given command of the invasion, believed that these conditions were an asset to the Allies, not a hindrance. Because these cities were so difficult to invade, MacArthur reasoned that they would be more lightly protected. Despite misgivings among military commanders, MacArthur’s plan won out and intensive training began for a mission that ultimately dwarfed D-Day in both size and scope.

With less than eight weeks of preparation, 70,000 of MacArthur’s men landed in the port city on Inchon, one hundred miles behind North Korean troop lines, in September 1950. As the general had predicted, the city was less heavily defended than expected, and the Allies were able to quickly gain ground, cutting off North Korean supply lines and re-capturing the South Korean capital of Seoul within a month (Figure 25.6). The so-called “Miracle at Inchon” also took pressure off the Pusan Perimeter, allowing tens of thousands of men in the South to surge forward and join their comrades coming in from the west. The two forces combined to push the North Korean army not simply out of the south, but almost completely north to the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and China. Despite direct orders from President Truman to move troops away from the border for fear of inciting direct Chinese involvement in the conflict, MacArthur held his position, hoping to convince the leadership in Washington to invade China and rescue the nation from its communist captors. In early November, Chinese troops crossed the border into North Korea, attacking the U.N. forces from all sides as they scattered in confusion. MacArthur had severely underestimated the size and strength of the Chinese forces and soon found his army pushed back behind the 38th parallel that separated the northern and southern halves of the peninsula.

Figure 25.6: Vehicles of United Nations forces cross a pontoon bridge near Seoul, Korea during the Korean War. [3]


After January 1951, the two sides found themselves in a hopeless stalemate at the 38th parallel. MacArthur, frustrated by the turn of events and what he saw as hapless leadership in Washington, began to ignore direct orders and publicly criticize the president to the press, a decision that led Truman to unceremoniously fire MacArthur in April 1951 (Figure 25.7). His replacement, General Matthew Ridgeway, was more loyal to the president but no more capable of forcing a North Korean surrender. As the stalemate dragged on, both sides searched for peace. Only Joseph Stalin seemed to have a vested interest in keeping the war going, actively encouraging the North Koreans to continue fighting and offering financial and political support. It was only after Stalin’s sudden death in March 1953 that peace became possible. By July, North Korea signed an armistice agreement with South Korea, agreeing to maintain the 38th parallel as the dividing line between their two nations. Although North Korea had failed in its quest to reunite the Korean peninsula under one government, the U.N. had successfully contained communism and prevented its spread.

Figure 25.7: General Douglas MacArthur disembarks at Washington’s National Airport after being dismissed as Far East Supreme Commander, May 1951. [4]


25.25 Level 4

Compare the "Miracle at Inchon" invasion in Korea to the D-Day invasion in France. What do the two have in common?


25.26 - Level 2

Which of the following events opened the possibility for an armistice agreement between North and South Korea in 1953?

A

A decisive South Korean military victory

B

The death of Josef Stalin

C

The diplomatic efforts of Harry Truman

D

The firing of Gen. Douglas MacArthur


Spies, the Red Scare and McCarthyism

In the midst of the Korean War, another war was developing in the civilian world of the United States. Various events during the post-war era convinced many that the Soviets were in the midst of a pervasive campaign to infiltrate, spy on, and convert Americans to the communist way of life. What began as investigations into political threats eventually developed into grassroots anti-communism campaigns, public accusations, and blacklists.

Following World War II, concerns that Soviet spies had infiltrated the government’s ranks were rampant. The House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) started out as a prewar committee for investigating Americans with Nazi and fascist connections, and during the war investigated suspected Soviet spies. The committee continued this work well into peace time. With public fears about communist infiltration at an all-time high, the committee exploited that emotive state to engage in a number of high-profile investigations, some of which led to arrests and trials, and others which just involved accusations. One of the earliest public investigations involved Hollywood. The film and entertainment industry came under early attack due to fears that they were disseminating communist propaganda. Part of the suspicion stemmed from anti-Semitic fears that the Jewish-run film studio heads were particularly susceptible to communism, and therefore turning a blind eye to the communist infiltration within their organizations. Although the film industry had worked with the government during World War II to create war propaganda and none of the films produced in the post-war years offered much evidence of a pro-Soviet agenda, HUAC proceeded with an investigation. In October 1947, the committee subpoenaed more than forty members of the film industry to testify about their political affiliations. Aware that their appearances and testimony before the committee could impact their future careers, most of the witnesses took one of two paths. Some pleaded the 5th Amendment to avoid possibly incriminating themselves and others that decided to cooperate with the committee by “naming names,” or offering up testimony against other members of the film industry. One group of witnesses took a different approach, using their time in front of HUAC to openly challenge the constitutionality of the proceedings. Each man took the stand and used the public platform to denounce the interrogations as a violation of each person’s civil rights, since every American has the right to choose a political affiliation under the 1st Amendment. The so-called “Hollywood Ten” were found in contempt and sentenced to a year in prison for their rebellion. 

Although HUAC never developed much of a case against the film industry, the industry nonetheless reacted to the negative attention by enacting a harsh blacklist which forbade anyone even remotely connected with communist accusations from working. Those who were blacklisted often experienced this fate due to connections with organizations that promoted social and political causes, which ranged from promoting the desegregation of Major League baseball to supporting the U.S.-Soviet alliance during World War II. Many African American actors were blacklisted due to connections with civil rights organizations, prompting television networks to remove African Americans from their programming, lest they prove too “controversial” and provoke a viewer boycott. Others were blacklisted simply for having been previously married to a suspected communist. Some writers, actors, and directors were unable to find work for up to a decade after being blacklisted.

25.27 - Level 2

The House on Un-American Activities was initially created to:

A

Investigate whether Soviet spies had infiltrated the U.S. government

B

Investigate content in Hollywood films

C

Censor television shows

D

To investigate Americans with connections to Nazism or fascist governments


On the heels of the Hollywood Ten debacle, HUAC developed more concrete evidence of communist infiltration into the United States. In 1948, a Time magazine writer named Whitaker Chambers came forward to announce that State Department official Alger Hiss was a communist spy. Hiss, a high-level of member of the State Department who had access to the president and had participated in the founding of the United Nations, came from a seemingly unimpeachable background and most HUAC members did not take Chambers’ accusations seriously. The exception was junior member Richard Nixon, then in his first term as a Congressman from California. Nixon encouraged HUAC to further investigate both Chambers and Hiss, and found evidence that they had both committed espionage. Chambers produced State Department documents that Hiss had photocopied, as well as handwritten notes on matters of national security in Hiss’ handwriting. The evidence was strong enough to proceed with a trial. Although the statute of limitations had run out on a possible espionage charge, Hiss was charged and tried for perjury, found guilty, and sentenced to five years in prison (Figure 25.8).

Figure 25.8: Alger Hiss testifying at his perjury trial in 1949. Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress. [5]​​

The Hiss case was followed by the arrest of several high-profile atomic spies, people who had leaked secrets about the atomic bomb to the Soviets both before and after World War II. When the Soviets unexpectedly exploded their first atomic weapon in late 1949, it was clear they had received assistance from those ostensibly working for the United States. One atomic scientist, Klaus Fuchs, was arrested in 1949 for providing detailed blueprints for an atomic weapon. Upon interrogation, the FBI was able to find his Soviet contact, a man named Harry Gold. Gold, upon arrest, gave investigators information about his other contacts, which included a Los Alamos technician named David Greenglass. Greenglass, in turn, admitted he was committing espionage at the direction of his sister and brother-in-law, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. Both Rosenbergs were admitted and active members of the Communist Party and the accusations were enough to have them both arrested on espionage charges in 1950. Although both of the accused avidly protested their innocence, a jury found them guilty of conspiracy to commit espionage in 1951. In 1953, they became the first civilians executed for espionage during peacetime in U.S. history.

Years of high-profile investigations and trials had American fears about communist infiltration at a fever pitch. A first-term Senator from Wisconsin named Joseph McCarthy, looking for a way to ensure re-election, decided to exploit that fear. In 1950, in the midst of the atom spy trials and on the eve of the Korean War, McCarthy gave a speech in which he accused the government of knowingly employing more than 200 known communists. The speech caused an uproar and led to a seemingly unending string of background checks and investigations by both the Senate and HUAC. McCarthy leveraged the publicity from his speech to briefly become one of the most powerful members of the Senate. He openly accused his political enemies of communism, particularly those who suggested that his methods were cruel and unconstitutional. Well-respected journalist Edward R. Murrow, who was courageous enough to create exposes on the destructive nature of McCarthy's tactics, was rewarded for his bravery with pulled advertising, the investigation of his producers, and ultimately, the loss of his television show. McCarthy’s scare tactics were very effective and seemingly impossible to overcome.

Spotlight on Primary Source



 1950, two days after his speech in Wheeling, W.V., Sen. Joseph McCarthy sent a telegram warning Harry Truman that if he did not investigate the claims of communists working for the government, McCarthy would expose him as being soft on communism. This is Truman’s reply. It remained unsent.

Figure 25.9. President Truman's unsent reply to Senator McCarthy's telegram. [6]

Question 25.28

25.28 - Level 5

Why did Truman not send this telegram to Senator McCarthy? In your opinion, if Truman had sent the telegram, would that have changed McCarthy’s tactics?

Click here to see the answer to Question 25.28.


McCarthy met his downfall when he accused U.S. Army leadership of communist sympathies. In 1953, nearly the end of the Korean War, one of his legal aides was drafted into the Army and McCarthy attempted to convince the Secretary of the Army to intercede in preventing the young man’s assignment overseas. When the Secretary of the Army refused to interfere, McCarthy instigated an investigation of communists in the Army. The Army, in turn, charged McCarthy with abusing his power in order to win preferential treatment for his subordinates. The two month Congressional investigation was the first to be televised, and garnered a large amount of public attention due to McCarthy’s notoriety (Figure 25.10). While the Army was cleared of wrong-doing, McCarthy’s behavior earned him censure from his colleagues in the Senate. The investigation opened people’s eyes to McCarthy’s immoral tactics and boorish behavior. After the hearings, his popularity waned and he soon fell from public favor, dying in obscurity in 1957 at the age of 48.

Figure 25.10: Joseph McCarthy with Chief Counsel representing the U.S. Army, Joseph Welch, during the Senate Subcommittee Hearing on the Army-McCarthy dispute, 1954. ​ [7]

While McCarthy’s power only lasted four years, the impact of his fear-mongering was long lasting. In addition to Hollywood blacklists, politicians backtracked on some of their liberal policies for fear of being perceived as soft on communism. This same fear instigated our involvement in both the Korean War and the later Vietnam conflict. Because so many civil liberties organizations were flagged by HUAC as security risks or possible communist fronts, the civil rights movements of the post-war years lost momentum. Members shied away from these organizations for fear of having their lives destroyed by accusations of communist sympathies. Southern white supremacists, when challenged by civil rights protesters, could now easily silence their detractors by accusing them of being communist shills. It would be more than a decade before the United States managed to pull free from the spell of the Red Scare.

25.29 - Level 2

Match the individuals put under investigation during the “Red Scare” with the punishments that they ultimately received.

Premise
Response
1

Julius Rosenberg

A

One year in prison

2

Alger Hiss

B

Five years in prison

3

Lester Cole (member of the “Hollywood Ten”)

C

No prison term

4

Edward R. Murrow

D

Executed

Question 25.30

25.30 - Level 6

Develop arguments both for and against the rationality of the “Red Scare” in Cold War America. In other words, were there legitimate reasons for American politicians to be worried about communist infiltration of American society, or was the whole episode simply a case of mass panic?

Click here to see the answer to Question 25.30.

Eisenhower and the New Look

After the deadly, costly, and unpopular Korean War ended in 1953, newly elected President Dwight Eisenhower decided that the United States needed to take its foreign policy in a different direction. Eisenhower, the architect of D-Day and the Allied victory in Europe during World War II, believed that the increased military spending brought on by NSC-68 had the potential to exhaust national resources and potentially destroy the delicate balance of the U.S. government by giving too much power to the military. Instead of direct military incursions, there were other, potentially more effective methods of exacting influence with allies and enemies.

One of Eisenhower’s methods was to build up the nuclear arsenal. Already possessing a significant advantage over the Soviets in this area and having just successfully tested a thermonuclear weapon, the United States could theoretically use this massive destructive potential as a force for good. He believed the arsenal would deter nations without a nuclear option from interfering with U.S. interests abroad. As for the Soviets, he believed that since both nations now had sizeable nuclear arsenals, the potential for mutually assured destruction was apparent. Neither nation would use its weapons on the other due to the guarantee of an immediate retaliatory strike. The implied threat of the U.S. arsenal would reduce the number of direct conflicts the United States needed to engage.

Eisenhower believed that another way to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives without direct military intervention was the use of diplomacy. The President wanted to indicate a willingness to compromise, yet simultaneously portray resolve to maintain his stance on certain topics: namely, an unwillingness to budge on the subject of containment. In order to promote diplomacy as a peace-keeping tactic, he developed the diplomatic corps, met with world leaders, and increased the U.S. role in the United Nations.

25.31 - Level 2

Which of the following is the term for the philosophy that because the United States and the Soviet Union both had nuclear arsenals, they were guaranteed to never use them due to the grave consequences?

A

Disproportionate retaliation

B

Détente

C

Mutually assured destruction

D

Disarmament


What Eisenhower could not solve with diplomacy or threats, he hoped to accomplish with covert operations. Using the relatively new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the President hoped to subtly (or not) guide the trajectory of foreign affairs in favor of the United States. The use of covert operations became a defining feature of the Eisenhower presidency.

Question 25.32

25.32 - Level 4

Why do you think President Eisenhower used covert means to achieve his foreign policy goals?

Click here to see the answer to Question 25.32.


25.33 - Level 1

Which of the following was not a central feature of President Eisenhower’s approach to fighting the Cold War?

A

The stockpiling of nuclear weapons

B

Diplomatic engagement

C

CIA covert operations

D

Direct military interventions


In a number of cases, the Eisenhower administration used covert operations to overthrow governments deemed threatening to U.S. interests abroad. Iran represented one of the first times the U.S. government successfully used a covert operation in this fashion. Before the 1950s, the United States did not have much of a direct relationship with the Iranians. Great Britain exerted an extreme degree of control over the Iranian petroleum industry, which meant that Iranians did not much benefit from their nation’s most valuable natural resource, while Americans benefited greatly as the recipient of cheap oil. As long as Great Britain maintained its economic hold over Iran, there was not much reason for the United States to intervene.

That changed in 1950, when the Iranians elected Mohammed Mossadegh as their prime minister. Although Mossadegh was not a communist, he did advocate for some socialist policies, first and foremost among them the desire to nationalize the nation’s oil industry and wrest it away from outsiders. Since Iranians received less than 10% of profits under the current system, Mossadegh’s plan was incredibly popular among voters. After gaining office in the spring of 1951, the new prime minister remained true to his word and passed a law effectively removing the British from control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Part of the law included a plan to reimburse the British for their losses.

Great Britain and the United States did not take kindly to this turn of events. Great Britain faced the loss of an incredibly lucrative arm of its overseas economic concerns, and the United States faced the possibility of higher fuel prices, unthinkable at a time when Americans were increasingly living farther from work and commuting every day in large, heavy, gas-guzzling cars. British lawmakers believed they had three possible courses of action. They could engage in a direct military action against Iran in order to reassert control of the AIOC, they could halt all petroleum production and hope that the Iranians incurred enough economic difficulties that they changed their minds about nationalization, or they could stage a coup and engineer the creation of a new Iranian government more amenable to British policies. They initially went with the second option and halted all petroleum production, which did not resume until 1953. True to expectations, the impact on the Iranian government was disastrous, but this was not enough to change Mossadegh’s mind. Not wanting to invest in another foreign war while still in recovery from World War II, the only remaining option was overthrowing the government.

Great Britain enlisted the help of the U.S. in engineering the coup, preying on its fears about communism. In August 1953, the two nations paid masses of people to pose as communist Mossadegh supporters staging a large demonstration in the streets of Tehran, the capital of Iran. After contriving a blatant communist connection to Mossadegh, the U.S. felt justified, through its containment policy, in contriving a CIA covert action in conjunction with Iranian military officers to put down the “demonstration” and overthrow the government. Having deposed and jailed Mossadegh, the U.S. forces installed the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in his place. The Shah promptly denationalized the AIOC, and with the help of the United States, remained in power as a dictator for the next 26 years, when the consequences of United States intervention in Iran finally came to bear.

Ten months later, the United States engineered a second coup in Guatemala, this time for much more nebulous reasons. In 1950, the nation democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz Guzman as its president. Arbenz moved to enact a campaign of land redistribution, which involved taking unused land from private companies and other large landholders and giving it to peasants. Eisenhower hoped that deposing Arbenz would have two positive results: one, it would allow the U.S. to install a leader of its own choosing, and two, it would send a message to the Soviet Union that communist expansion would not be tolerated in the western hemisphere. Between 1953 and 1954, the CIA engineered a public campaign to discredit Arbenz, while also carrying out a secret campaign of intimidation against his advisors. Then, using local anti-Arbenz forces as a cover, the agency engineered an overthrow of the government, forcing Arbenz to flee into exile in Mexico. The U.S. promptly installed the coup’s military leader, Juan Castillo Armas, as the military dictator of Guatemala, ensuring that U.S. interests would henceforth be promoted.

Although the U.S. involvement in this coup was mostly kept secret, some insiders viewed the event with skepticism. One of the companies that stood to lose significant profits under the Arbenz land redistribution plan was the United Fruit Company, an American company which controlled as much as 40% of Guatemalan land. Major investors in the company included Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and CIA director Allen Dulles, prompting many spectators to question whether U.S. intervention might be the result of protecting the personal interests of these high-ranking stakeholders.

Eisenhower supplemented the use of covert operations with extensive spy operations using ultra-high altitude reconnaissance U-2 planes. These planes flew thirteen miles high, well out of the range of the available anti-aircraft missiles. The U.S. began flying missions over the Soviet Union beginning in 1956, and while the Soviets were aware of the missions, they were left with few options on how to address the situation. They could not shoot the planes down, and could not acknowledge the existence of the planes without admitting they were powerless to stop them.

That changed by 1960, when the Soviets developed a new surface to air missiles capable of reaching the U-2 planes. On May 1 of that year, the United States discovered the new development when the Soviets announced that they had shot down a U.S. spy plane. The United States initially denied the plane was theirs, and then announced that it was a weather satellite that had veered into Soviet airspace. This cover-up story immediately fell apart when the Soviets released a photo of both the plane and its captured CIA pilot, Francis Gary Powers. U-2 pilots were told to take a cyanide capsule in the event that they were shot down so that they could not be captured or interrogated. Powers did not follow the protocol and therefore became the centerpiece of a Soviet propaganda campaign designed to point out U.S. violations of their sovereignty (Figure 25.11).

Figure 25.11: Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev visits the wreckage of the U.S. U-2 spy plane shot down over the Soviet Union, 1960. [8]


The U-2 incident severely injured U.S.-Soviet relations. When Powers’s plane was shot down, President Eisenhower was preparing for a much-anticipated summit with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev on May 14. Eisenhower hoped that the meeting would result in progress on mutual limits to nuclear arms development, but this crisis added mistrust and anger to an already tense situation. Although the summit met as planned and Eisenhower apologized and admitted U.S. responsibility for the spy plane, Khrushchev decided he no longer wanted to work with Eisenhower and walked out of the meeting shortly after it began. The Soviets tried Powers and jailed him until February 1962, when the Soviets exchanged him for famed spy Rudolf Abel.

One final tool in Eisenhower’s foreign policy arsenal was the burgeoning space program. After World War II, both the Soviet Union and the United States developed an obsession with rocket technology and its possibilities. With the two superpowers in a struggle to control the Earth, it seemed the only unexplored frontier was outer space, and both nations wanted to dominate it. In October 1957, the Soviets gained an early victory in the space race when they launched Sputnik, the first satellite, into space. The U.S. responded by launching a satellite of its own four months later, in January 1958. Later that same year, the government decided to create a full-time space program, to be administered by a civilian agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA immediately developed Project Mercury, with a projected goal of getting men into space and orbiting the Earth. The first astronauts hired into the program, the Mercury Seven, became instant heroes and role models for millions of Americans (Figure 25.12). The space program provided a steady stream of exciting news as the astronauts embarked on increasingly difficult missions and vied to keep up with the Soviets, and was one of the few aspects of the Cold War that evoked almost entirely upbeat coverage.

Figure 25.12: The Mercury Seven astronauts pose for a publicity photo in their space suits, 1958. [9]

Question 25.34

25.34 - Level 4

In consideration of Truman and Eisenhower’s approaches to Cold War politics, explain at least one similarity and one difference.

Click here to see the answer to Question 25.34.

Question 25.35

25.35 - Level 5

Describe some of the covert operations authorized by the Eisenhower administration. Were these actions consistent with the stated American ideals of democracy and self-representation?

Click here to see the answer to Question 25.35.

The Kennedy Administration

John F. Kennedy won the presidential election of 1960, beating Republican challenger Richard Nixon by one of the smallest margins in American electoral history. Kennedy, who at 43 was bringing a young wife and two young children with him to the White House, represented the youthfulness overtaking the United States in the post-war era. His youth and vivacity seemed like a breath of fresh air after decades of elderly statesmen, and people hoped that his youth would translate into a fresh approach to governance. Indeed, his campaign promise to support civil rights initiatives was a new concept for the Democratic Party and brought in numerous young voters.

However, at heart, Kennedy was a staunch Cold Warrior more concerned with destroying communism than with fixing civil rights issues, and with mixed results. This became apparent almost immediately, when Kennedy approved a long-germinating mission that had originated under the Eisenhower administration. The mission called for CIA-trained Cuban exiles to stage an invasion of communist Cuba in order to engineer an overthrow of the government. Long a vacation spot for wealthy Americans and a playground for the Mafia, Cuba had come under the control of communist guerrillas led by Fidel Castro in 1959. Castro immediately nationalized all U.S. businesses, prompting the U.S. to sever diplomatic relations with the nation and institute a trade embargo. Since then, the U.S. government had struggled to find a way to push Castro from power. Many Cubans had fled Castro’s Cuba, which convinced the Eisenhower administration that most Cubans did not care for Castro and were waiting to be rescued from his influence.

Kennedy, only weeks into his first term as president, had early misgivings about the invasion plan, but ultimately signed off on it. From the beginning, the invasion was a disaster. On April 17, 1,400 CIA-trained Cubans came ashore on the southern beaches of the island, known as the Bay of Pigs. U.S. ships painted to look like Cuban military vessels brought the men ashore, while disguised planes were set to perform air strikes on the Cuban air fields to prevent bombings. They expected to be greeted as liberators by the locals, but instead, they were met by the Cuban army, which had learned of the invasion plan months prior from spies in the Cuban exile community. Meanwhile, the planned air strikes missed their targets. Cuban reporters were on-hand for the entire event, broadcasting events as they unfolded, thus blowing the cover of this supposedly clandestine action. Approximately 100 of the invaders were killed, but the rest surrendered almost immediately and were marched through the streets of Havana, providing an excellent propaganda opportunity for Castro’s government. The men were held prisoner until the following year, when Kennedy was able to exchange them for millions of dollars in food and medical supplies. The Bay of Pigs invasion was a dismal failure and a grim start for the Kennedy presidency.

25.36 - Level 3

Which of the following were NOT outcomes of the Bay of Pigs invasion?

A

Thousands of CIA-trained Cuban exiles were taken prisoner by the Cuban governor

B

President Kennedy permanently lifted the trade embargo against Cuba

C

Cuba scored a massive public relations boost

D

Cuba declared war on the United States


Anxious to repair the political damage from the Bay of Pigs incident, Kennedy immediately plunged into preparations for an upcoming summit with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to discuss the nuclear arsenals and the mounting troubles in Berlin, among other pressing issues. Those closest to him advised against meeting with Khrushchev so early in his presidency, but Kennedy insisted. He believed that his charming manner, so effective with others, would work on Khrushchev, not realizing that his Soviet counterpart disdained personal charm as a crutch for those with lesser intellect.

Kennedy and Khrushchev met in Vienna in June 1961 (Figure 25.13). By all accounts, the summit did not go well for Kennedy. The meeting did not have a set itinerary, with both sides theoretically coming together for an informal exchange of ideas. Khrushchev took advantage of the informal format to take charge of the discussion, berating Kennedy and U.S. policy on a variety of Cold War issues and taking particular issue with the western control of West Berlin. When Kennedy expressed a concern for the devastation a nuclear war might bring, Khrushchev interpreted this as a sign of weakness. For much of the talk, Kennedy sat in amazed silence as the older man pontificated. Even Kennedy admitted that Khrushchev had gotten the better of him in Vienna. Following the meeting, Kennedy came home and promptly asked for an increase in defense spending, while Khrushchev resumed above-ground nuclear testing, which he had temporarily halted.

Figure 25.13: Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sits down with President John Kennedy at the Vienna Summit, June 1961.​ [10]


More ominously, Khrushchev also approved the building of a wall around West Berlin, effectively closing it off from the rest of Berlin and East Germany. Millions of refugees had streamed into Western Europe through West Berlin since World War II, which had become an embarrassment for the East German government. East German officials had wanted a wall for years, but Khrushchev felt it would be an admission of failure and potentially start a war with the United States. However, in the wake of the Vienna Summit, he realized that Kennedy would probably not interfere with the building of a wall because it would take pressure off the United States to keep peace in the city. Sure enough, on August 13, the East German government started constructing the wall, and although there was international outrage over the action as well as significant pushback from the locals, no military intervention followed. Kennedy sent Vice President Lyndon Johnson to Berlin to condemn the wall, but that was the extent of U.S. intervention. The wall, which divided Berlin for 28 years, stood as an international symbol of political oppression, but it also put an end to the constant border wrangling between the U.S. and the Soviet forces.

Still feeling confident about Kennedy’s unwillingness to mingle in Soviet affairs for fear of starting a war, Khrushchev took another bold step in 1962 by arranging to place Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) in Cuba. The Soviet Union had been supplying aid to Cuba in the years since the communist takeover, and now expected that favor in return. Khrushchev believed that these Cuban missiles were a quid pro quo, considering the recent placement of similar missiles by the U.S. in Turkey. When U.S. spy planes flew over Cuba in October 1962, they took thousands of photographs of a burgeoning nuclear launch site, some of which indicated that nuclear warheads were already on the island. This discovery launched a crisis, and brought the world the closest that it ever came to nuclear war.

Kennedy had several options on how to address the Cuban Missile Crisis. He could request that the Soviets remove the missiles, but this might be interpreted as weak. He could deploy troops to Cuba, but this meant a certain war with Cuba and probable war with the Soviets. The only other option was to blockade Cuba in an effort to prevent further supplies for the nuclear site from coming into the country. Kennedy ordered the blockade, all the while communicating with Khrushchev in an attempt to bring the crisis to an amicable conclusion. Meanwhile, the world watched as Soviet ships headed for Cuba confront the U.S. naval blockade. The confrontation ultimately ended on October 29, when the Soviet ships turned around rather than engaging with the U.S. naval vessels. 

Privately, Kennedy and Khrushchev worked out an agreement where they both removed missile sites from Turkey and Cuba, respectively. However, this agreement did not become public until years later. While U.S. sites in Turkey were already well established and took more time to dismantle, the Soviet sites in Cuba were still being built and therefore dismantled more quickly, and with news cameras looking on. As far as the world was concerned, Kennedy and Khrushchev had stood eye to eye, and Khrushchev was the one who backed down. It was a clear moment of victory for Kennedy at a time when he sorely needed it. For Khrushchev, the Cuban Missile Crisis spelled the end of his long political career. He endured censure for his behavior, which in Soviet eyes had made them look foolish. He was ousted as premier less than two years after the Cuban debacle.

25.37 - Level 1

Place the following events in chronological order.

A

Election of John Kennedy

B

Building of the Berlin Wall

C

U-2 incident

D

Vienna Summit

E

Cuban Missile Crisis

F

Overthrow of Guatamala's government


After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kennedy administration did not experience any other major world crises besides a growing concern over the situation in Vietnam. This allowed him to turn his attention to domestic issues, particularly the civil rights movement, which we will discuss in the next chapter. While Kennedy began working on civil rights legislation by the summer of 1963, he was assassinated on November 22, 1963, thus bringing to an end a short but contentious presidency filled with both epic failures and moments of triumph. Kennedy’s presidency, though brief, was a turning point of the Cold War, as both the United States and the Soviet Union came to realize the grave consequences that could come from their political posturing. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, both sides made overtures toward what would become détente, or an easing of tensions between the two nations. In July 1963, the White House and the Kremlin instituted a “hotline” between them as a method of instant communication in the event of another major crisis, and that same month, both nations signed a Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Although détente was not fully achieved for nearly a decade, the relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union would never again be as tense as it was for those few weeks in October 1962.

Conclusion

The United States emerged from the Second World War as a superpower, and immediately set about enjoying the economic and political benefits of that status. Although the post-war era was a time of great wealth and prosperity for the United States, it was also a time of fear. Concerns about communist infiltration and Soviet aggression plagued the United States just as it was easing into its status as a superpower. These fears caused the government to institute policies of containment, both domestic and foreign, which eased concerns to a certain degree, but also created a morass of political entanglements which became increasingly difficult to manage. Some U.S. interventions, like the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift, were effective and appreciated by those who received them. Other interventions, like those in Guatemala and Iran, were not so well received and had long- reaching consequences. U.S. attempts to dislodge the democratically elected governments of other nations left some with the feeling that the U.S. did not really care about fostering democracy, but rather about developing governments that were sympathetic to U.S. interests. The fact that Kennedy continued in that dubious tradition with Cuba and Vietnam demonstrated that the government was slow to learn the limits of containment.

Pre-Class Discussion Questions

Class Discussion 25.01

Class Discussion 25.01 - Level 2

Explain how family life changed in the postwar period and indicate the factors that created those changes.

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Class Discussion 25.02

Class Discussion 25.02 - Level 4

What were the political and economic factors that led to the Cold War? To what degree were the United States and the Soviet Union each culpable for this escalation in tensions?

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Class Discussion 25.03

Class Discussion 25.03 - Level 2

How did the Red Scare develop in the aftermath of World War II? What role did Senator Joseph McCarthy play in furthering the anti-communist hysteria? What lasting impact did the Red Scare have on American political and cultural life?

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Class Discussion 25.04

Class Discussion 25.04 - Level 4

Compare and contrast Truman’s approach to foreign policy with that of Dwight Eisenhower. How were the two approaches similar and how were they different?

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Class Discussion 25.05

Class Discussion 25.05 - Level 2

Why did the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba constitute a major crisis for both the Kennedy administration and the American people? What were the various proposed solutions to the crisis and what were the pros and cons of each option?

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Suggested Additional Material

The Cold War: A New History by John Lewis Gaddis.

Hidden Figures by Margot Shetterly

John F. Kennedy: An Unfinished Life by Robert Dallek

One Minute toMidnight- Michael Dobbs

Daring Young Men- Richard Reeves

In Denial: Historians, Communism and Espionage- John Haynes and Harvey Klehr

Answers to In-Chapter Discussion Questions

Answer to Question 25.04

Rapid, standardized community development that was affordable for the post-war family.

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Answer to Question 25.06

1) European economies and production was devastated, creating a massive demand for American goods; 2) the baby boom and expansion of housing market fueled the consumer economy; 3) the GI bill helped send a generation of veterans to college, giving them the skills for higher-earning jobs.

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Answer to Question 25.08

As with the League of Nations after World War I, the creators of the United Nations believed that international cooperation and diplomacy were key to collective security and the prevention of large scale conflagrations. Unlike with the League of Nations, however, the United States consented to membership, all major world powers were included in the initial charter, and all member nations now recognized the dire consequences of another breakdown in international diplomacy.

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Answer to Question 25.09

The tone of the newsreel is very serious and clearly points to the U.S., the UK and their allies as both the victors of the war and holders of the moral high ground after the war. The charges facing the defendants include (but are not limited to): crimes against humanity, destruction of cities, theft, murder, extermination, and other atrocities not militarily necessary for the prosecution of the war. Those on trial at Nuremberg appear indifferent or defiant in the face of their charges.

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Answer to Question 25.10

The Soviet Union did not want to rebuild Germany in the wake of World War II, due to the fact that the nation had been the aggressor in two major wars in less than 30 years’ time. The Soviets believed that the Germans should be kept in a state of weakness and poverty so as to properly control their nationalistic and militaristic tendencies. Additionally, the Soviets wanted to use the eastern half of Germany as part of a buffer zone to shield against future encroachment from the West. Although the Soviets and the Americans were allies during WWII, the two nations did not trust each other and had competing economic and political ideologies. The Soviets believed the United States was using the reconstruction period to force its political beliefs on all of Europe, and wanted to prevent that as much as possible.

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Answer to Question 25.22

Both a return to isolationism and continued diplomatic negotiations might be perceived as a sign of weakness by the Soviets. There was no public support for a war with the Soviets, nor was the military in any position to fight such a war. A larger U.S. presence in the world would demonstrate authority, but would also be very expensive and difficult to sustain in the long term.

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Answer to Question 25.28

Although we cannot say for sure why Truman did not send the telegram, we can make some assumptions. Because McCarthy had become very popular overnight and many Americans agreed with his position, Truman may not have wanted to take the unpopular step of admonishing McCarthy and possible ending up on the other side of McCarthy’s accusations. It is difficult to say whether such a response from the president would have had any impact on McCarthy’s action, and may have only served to inflame him.

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Answer to Question 25.30

1) Students arguing for the rationality of the Red Scare may point to actual Soviet spies that had infiltrated the American government, as well as the revolutionary goals of the American Communist Party; 2) Students arguing against its rationality may point to the Hollywood Blacklisting or the suppression of free speech and journalism, or the McCarthy hearings.     

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Answer to Question 25.32

This question is somewhat speculative, but we can assume that Eisenhower wanted to use covert methods because he did not want to give the appearance that the United States was exerting undue influence over the affairs of other nations. In many cases, the United States got involved in these situations not because it was asked, but because to do so was in the best interest of the United States. Such behavior might seem out of step with the stated intentions of U.S. foreign policy.

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Answer to Question 25.34

1) Both Presidents were very concerned about the spread of Communism, and both generally subscribed to the policy of containment. 2) A major difference was that Truman was more willing to use direct military force (Korea) while Eisenhower was more focused on covert CIA actions and establishing better diplomatic relations with the Soviets.  

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Answer to Question 25.35

1) Students may discuss the interventions in Iran, Guatemala, and (planned) in Cuba. 2) These were clearly inconsistent with American political ideals, since they overthrew democratically elected governments and installed autocratic leaders who were more favorable to American interests. 

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Answers to Pre-Class Discussion Questions

Answer to Class Discussion 25.01

The baby boom radically increased the size of the average American family, which led to a housing boom as well as a general increase in consumerism. Families no longer lived in multigenerational households, instead electing to set up smaller households with just nuclear families. Although women were still in the workforce, they were heavily encouraged to stay at home and have children if possible, resulting in a large number of single income families.

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Answer to Class Discussion 25.02

The Cold War was initially the result of the mistrust that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States and their ideological clashes. However, as the United States offered more monetary and humanitarian aid to Europe and the Soviet Union exercised ever harsher control over Eastern Europe, the two sides each suspected the other of using nefarious means in order to encroach on the other’s territory. Both nations encouraged this mistrust of the other through propaganda which painted the other side as evil and bent on world domination.

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Answer to Class Discussion 25.03

The Red Scare was a U.S. reaction to the anti-communist and anti-Soviet hysteria that developed after World War II. The government was concerned that Soviet spies had taken advantage of the relative openness of the U.S. system in order to infiltrate government agencies and the entertainment industry. As HUAC attempted to scour the government and private sector of its possible communist influences, grassroots organizations developed for the same purpose. Senator McCarthy encouraged this line of thinking through claims that the government was soft on communism and allowing communists to flourish in the United States. He also encouraged the Senate as well as the House of Representatives to hold hearings and question supposed communists about their activities and publicly accused many people of communist sympathies. Although McCarthy was later discredited due to his own actions, politicians as well as workers in private industry continued to be affected by the hysteria. Politicians took a hard line against communists for fear of being labeled a communist sympathizer and left-wing policies became unpopular, lest they be associated with communist ideals.

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Answer to Class Discussion 25.04

Both Truman and Eisenhower were proponents of postwar liberalism, which called for a hawkish foreign policy. Truman’s approach was more public, focusing on humanitarian efforts, communist containment, and nation building in the wake of the war.Eisenhower was concerned about the buildup of a large military and wanted to find alternative methods of dealings with external threats that did not involve military intervention. He was also a fan of covert activities as a method of achieving U.S. foreign policy goals.

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Answer to Class Discussion 25.05

The placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba was problematic because the island nation was located only 90 miles off the coast of Florida, and the missiles in question were capable of reaching virtually any place in the United States within minutes. The United States had several options, all of which posed potential dangers. If it allowed the Soviets to continue placing weapons, this would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. If the U.S. invaded Cuba, this would spark a war with Cuba, and possibly the Soviets by extension. If the U.S. blockaded Cuba in an attempt to prevent Soviet cargo ships from reaching Cuba, this also came with risks, as the Soviet ships might fire on the U.S. ships, thus sparking a sea war between the two nations.

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Image Credits

[1] Image courtesy of the National Archives ARC# 292612 in the Public Domain.

[2] Image courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum in the Public Domain.

[3] Image courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum in the Public Domain.

[4] Image courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum in the Public Domain.

[5] Image courtesy of the Library of Congress in the Public Domain.

[6] Image courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, ARC# 201514, in the Public Domain. 

[7] Image courtesy of the United States Senate in the Public Domain.

[8] Image courtesy of the C.I.A. Library in the Public Domain.

[9] Image courtesy of NASA in the Public Domain.

[10] Image courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library and Museum in the Public Domain.